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Final-Offer-Selection 
VS Last-Offer-By-Issue 
Systems of Arbitration 
A. V. Subbarao 
This paper analyzes both theoretically and empirically 
the impact of the two "one-or-the-other" Systems of bind-
ing interest arbitration on négociation process and 
outcome. 
Eversince Cari Stevens1 proposed "one-or-the-other" arbitration 
as a "strike-like institution" in 1966, it attracted the attention of both 
practitioners and researchers in the field of labour-management rela-
tions. It was adopted as a method of impasse resolution in a number of 
public and private sector jurisdictions in North America.2 Recently, 
there is an increasing volume of writings analyzing the expériences with 
this method of arbitration in différent jurisdictions.3 
* SUBBARAO, A.V., Associate Professor and Coordinator of the Human 
Resource Management Division. The Department of Business Administration, University 
of Ottawa, Ottawa, Ontario. 
** This paper is partly based upon the doctoral dissertation submitted by the 
author to the Graduate Faculty of the University of Minnesota. 
1
 Cari STEVENS, «Is Compulsory Arbitration Compatible with Bargaining?» 
Industrial Relations, Vol. 5, No. 2, February, 1966, 38-52. 
2
 For a review of «one-or-the-other» (final offer) method of arbitration in 
différent jurisdictions in North America, see Peter FEUILLE, Final offer Arbitration: 
Concepts, Developments and Techniques, Chicago: International Personnel Management 
Association, 1975, and James L. Stern, Charles M. REHMUS, J. Joseph LOEWEN-
BERG, Hirschel KASPER and Barbara D. DENNIS, Final Offer Arbitration: The 
Effect on Public Safety Employée Bargaining, Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington 
Books, 1975. 
3
 See, Fred WHITNEY, « Final-Offer Arbitration: The Indianapolis Expé-
rience», Monthly Labor Review, Vol. 96, No. 5, May 1973, 20-25; Gary LONG, and 
Peter FEUILLE, «Final-Offer Arbitration: 'Sudden Death' in Eugène», Industrial and 
Labor Relations Review, Vol. 27, No. 2, January 1974, 196-203 ; Charles M. REHMUS, 
«Is a 'Final Offer' Even Final», Monthly Labor Review, Vol. 97, No. 9, September 
1974, pp. 43-45; James L. STERN, « Final-Offer-Arbitration — Initial Expérience in 
Wisconsin», Monthly Labor Review, Vol. 97, No. 9, September 1974, pp. 39-43. 
Gène SWIMMER, «Final Position Arbitration and Inter-temporamental Compromise: 
The University of Alberta Compromise», Relations Industrielles, Vol. 30, No. 3, 1975, 
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But, the findings are not conclusive with regard to the impact of the 
"one-or-the-other" arbitration on negotiation process and outcome be-
cause of the différences in impasse resolution procédures among différent 
jurisdictions. The "one-or-the-other" arbitration is différent from one 
jurisdiction to the other and the différences are dichotomized under 
the following four catégories. First, in some jurisdictions like in Wiscon-
sin,4 an arbitrator is required to décide and award "one-or-the-other" 
of the parties' package of final offers while in others like in Michigan,5 
a third party can award by selecting on each separate issue "one-or-
the-other" of the bilatéral negotiating parties' last offers. In this paper, 
the former is called the final-offer-selection (FOS) and the latter, the 
last-offer-by-issue (LOBI) System of arbitration and in both Systems, 
third party's award is binding on bilatéral parties. Second, in some 
cases, a single third party will résolve the impasses whereas in others, 
a tripartite panel of arbitrators is required. Third, in some jurisdictions, 
negotiators are permitted to change their last positions and third 
parties are allowed to médiate and arbitrate while, in others, bilatéral 
parties submit their respective final positions along with their arguments, 
on the basis of which third parties are required only to arbitrate and 
award. Fourth and final, only économie issues in impasse are arbitrable 
in some législations whereas in others, ail issues are subjected to third 
party arbitration. 
A system of "one-or-the-other" arbitration adopted in any juris-
diction in North America consists of a combination of one of the 
dichotomized provisions of the four catégories described above. But, in 
this research, FOS is defined as a System of binding arbitration in 
which bilatéral negotiators submit their respective package of final offers 
and a single third party neutral, without and médiation, arbitrâtes and 
awards one of the two packages. And the LOBI is a System in which 
bilatéral parties submit their respective last offers on the issues in 
impasse and a single arbitrator, without médiation, awards by selecting 
on each separate issue "one-or-the-other" of the parties' last offers. 
pp. 533-536. Robert E. DUNHAM, «Interest Arbitration in Non-Federal Public Em-
ployaient» The Arbitration Journal, Vol. 20, No. 4, March 1976, pp. 45-57; Lawrence 
T. HOLDEN Jr., « Final-Offer-Arbitration in Massachusetts: One Year Later», The 
Arbitration Journal, Vol. 31, No. 1, March 1976, 26-35; and James D. DWORKIN, 
«Final Position Arbitration and Inter-temporal Compromise» Relations Industrielles, 
Vol. 32, No. 2, 1977, pp. 250-261. 
4
 Wisconsin Statutes of 1973. Section 111.77. 
5
 Michigan Police-Fire Fighters Arbitration Act of 1972, Section 8. 
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The purpose of this research is to investigate the impact of thèse 
two différent Systems of arbitration on bilatéral negotiation process and 
outcome. The negotiation process is operationally defined to mean the 
parties' concessions. The outcome is the différence between the parties' 
positions at the conclusion of bilatéral negotiations which may ter-
minate either in a settlement or in an arbitration and it is called the 
terminal outcome. Negotiation process and terminal outcome are the 
two components of the dépendent variable and the two Systems of 
arbitration are the two catégories of a single independent variable. The 
impact of the independent variable on the depended variable is investi-
gated in this study and the research problem is succinctly stated in the 
following two questions : 
1) Do thèse two Systems of arbitration hâve a corresponding dif-
ferential impact on the negotiation process and outcome ? 
2) If so, how do the Systems of arbitration differ from each other 
with regard to their relative impact on the negotiation process 
and outcome? 
In this study, an expérimental research was conducted for the 
purpose of finding spécifie answers to thèse questions. Because of the 
différences among the Systems of arbitration in différent jurisdictions 
described in paragraph two of this paper, field research was not selected 
for investigating thèse research questions. Moreover, the researcher's 
inaccessibility to labour-management bilatéral negotiations in field set-
tings added to the problems in pursuing field research. Laboratory 
expérimental method, on the other hand, permitted the control of 
variables other than the arbitral décision criteria which was considered 
important for the purpose of understanding différences in impact on 
negotiation process and outcome between the FOS and LOBI Systems 
of arbitration. 
In the following first section, the theoretically hypothesized 
impact of the two Systems of binding arbitration on negotiations is 
briefly summarized. The second section contains a detailed account of 
the expérimental research design. The third section présents the results 
of the study which are discussed with respect to the two research 
questions raised above. 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Théories of labor negotiations suggest that the parties will threaten 
and will also resort to work stoppages, if necessary, for the purpose of 
imposing the costs of disagreement on the opposent. If the costs of 
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disagreeing are greater than the costs of agreeing, then the opponent 
will concède6. The threatened cost associated with bilatéral negotiations 
is what assures concession behavior and true negotiations. 
In situations where the parties are prohibited from work stoppage 
either by mutual agreement or by statute and are required to résolve 
their impasses through binding arbitration, they can only "threaten" 
arbitration during negotiations. The "threat of arbitration" implies that 
either party may indicate its intention to refer an impasse to a neutral 
third party whose award will be final and binding on the parties. 
Stevens7 suggests that under certain Systems of interest arbitration the 
party's threat of arbitration, much like the threat of work stoppage, 
may hâve the effect of increasing the opponent's subjective estimate 
of the costs of disagreeing on one's own terms and thus, may involve 
the "concession and compromise posture" crucial to the negotiation 
process. Stevens8 theorizes that in pre-arbitration negotiations, a party's 
subjective estimate of the cost of disagreeing with the opponent is a 
function of the party's expectations regarding a possible interest arbi-
tration award. The cost of disagreement is the cost of the award. The 
greater the "uncertainty" associated with an award, the greater will 
be the expected cost of disagreement. The "uncertainty" of an award is 
defined to mean the probability that the interest arbitration would resuit 
in an outcome to a party less désirable than the party could hâve 
obtained through a bilatéral seulement. The party's threat of arbitration 
will cause the opponent to concède if the "threat" imposes a cost of 
disagreeing which exceeds the cost of agreeing on the party's offer. 
In other words, the "uncertainty" of an award in a System of binding 
interest arbitration is theoretically expected to encourage free negotia-
tions. The parties' threats of arbitration may generate concessions and 
compromises. 
In the FOS System, the award is "uncertain" to the extent that the 
arbitrator may order either of the parties' package of final offers. One 
party's "threat" of arbitration may generate concessions from the other 
only if the other expects the cost of disagreeing to be greater than the 
expected cost of agreeing on such terms. The expected cost of agreeing 
with the opponent is the différence between the opponent's and the 
threatener's offer if they were to settle on the opponent's terms at a 
6
 Neil W. CHAMBERLAIN, and James W. KUHN. Collective Bargaining 
(Second Edition), New York: McGraw Hill Book Company, 1965. 
7
 STEVENS, op. cit. 
8
 STEVENS, ibid. 
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given point in time during negotiations. The expected cost of disagreeing 
with the opponent is the différence between the opponent's offer and 
the expected award. Since the third party's award is of the strictly 
"either-or" variety, the cost of disagreement is minimized if one 
expects his package to be awarded. If, however, one expects the 
neutral to rule in favor of the opponent, than the expected cost of 
disagreement is high. Negotiators may reduce their respective expected 
costs of disagreement through concessions and compromises. They may 
negotiate (i.e., concède and compromise) at least until their respective 
expected costs of disagreement are perceived as equal. At that point, 
the différence between their offers is expected to be small. 
In the LOBI, the neutral will award by picking on each issue either 
the party's or the opponent's last offers. The third party neutral may 
exercise the arbitral discrétion in either of the foliowing two ways. One, 
an arbitrator may award by selecting on some issues the party's last 
offers and on the reste those of the opponent in such a way that the 
award compromises the interests of both parties. On the other hand, 
an arbitrator, by picking on few issues from the party's package and 
on the rest, from that of the opponent, may create an uncoordinated 
package and issue an award which, to a party, may be more undesir-
able than the opponent's package of last offers. Should a party expect 
the former to take place, he may concède on those issues that he would 
not want to risk and develop his last offers in such a way that they 
might be found reasonable and picked up by the arbitrator. If the 
bilatéral parties concède on différent issues, their concessions may not 
converge into an agreement. The sum of the différences between their 
respective last positions at the termination of negotiations may be large 
and it may even be greater than that in the FOS. But, if the parties 
expect that the arbitrator might award an uncoordinated package, they 
may negotiate and concède for the purpose of minimizing the cost of 
disagreement and avoiding an undesirable award. The parties however, 
may fail to reach an agreement if there are différences between their 
perceptions of the expected undesirability of the award. But, the sum of 
the différences between their respective last offers on issues in impasse 
is expected to be small. 
Thus, bilatéral parties are expected to negotiate for the purpose of 
reaching agreements in both the Systems of arbitration. Their respective 
concessions in the two Systems are hypothesized to be equal. With the 
resuit, the terminal outcomes of bilatéral negotiations are hypothesized 
to be equal in the FOS and LOBI Systems of arbitration. Thèse 
hypothèses were tested in a controlled laboratory experiment. 
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THE EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
Following the lead of Siegel and Fouraker,9 the laboratory 
expérimental method is used to investigate the impact of the two 
Systems of binding arbitration — the independent variable — on the 
— dépendent variable — as measured in terms of concession process 
and terminal outcome. The FOS and LOBI Systems are the two separate 
and distinct expérimental treatments and are employed, respectively, as 
expérimental conditions I, and II in the single factor experiment. The 
two expérimental conditions are exactly similar in ail respects except in 
terms of the décision criteria used by the third party neutral in issuing 
arbitration awards. The expérimental controls and procédures which are 
alike in the two expérimental conditions are discussed in the following 
two-sections and the third sub-section présents the third party neutral's 
décision criteria used in each expérimental condition. 
Expérimental Controls 
The laboratory experiment is controlled so that the différence in 
variance in the dépendent variable between the two expérimental 
conditions can be attributed to the différences in arbitral décision 
criteria between the two Systems of binding arbitration. Explicitly, the 
spécifie variables controlled by the laboratory experiment are (1) the 
information given to negotiators (2) interpersonal communications 
between negotiators and (3) their bargaining behavior. 
First, the scénario for negotiations in the experiment was the same 
in both the expérimental conditions. The parties were required to 
negotiate over two issues, namely, the percentage increase of annual 
salary and the réduction of weekly hours of work of firemen in the City 
of Winterland (fictitious name). The negotiators were given detailed 
information regarding the budget of the fire department, number of 
firemen employed and the existing salaries and hours of work of firemen 
in the City of Winterland. In addition, the information given to the 
bargainers also provided full détails on the following factors : 
1) Comparative salaries of firemen in other cities ; 
2) Comparative salaries of policemen in the same city ; 
9
 Sidney SIEGEL, and Lawrence E. FOURAKER. Bargaining and Group 
Décision Making, (Experiments in Bilatéral Monopoly), New York: McGraw-Hill 
Book Company, Inc., 1960, 132 pp. 
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3) Comparative salaries of policemen in other cities ; 
4) Comparative salaries of building trades in the same city ; 
5) Cost of living figures in the same city ; 
6) Ability of the city to pay ; and 
7) Wage controls. 
The «Information for Bargainers» was authenticated by Local 1215 of 
the International Association of Firefighters, Richfield, Minnesota. 
This authentication helped in the design of a scénario which was as 
close to reality as possible, with regard to the issues, the percentage 
increase of annual salaries and the réduction of weekly hours of work 
of firefighters. 
Second, the interpersonal communications were controlled in the 
experiment by conducting negotiations in silence through the exchange 
of written bids transmitted by the expérimenter. This procédure eli-
minated variance associated with interpersonal perceptions, préjudices 
and incompatibilities.10 
Third, the bargaining behavior which also was controlled in this 
experiment was defined as the expression of threats or promises be-
tween the opponents. Availability of threat messages may stimulate 
compétition among subjects and thereby reduce negotiating efficiency. 
Threats and promises were controlled in this expérimental negotiation 
process by not allowing the use of such messages. They were elimi-
nated partly because of past research results,11 but also because of 
the author's expérience with a pilot experiment where the subjects 
were provided with one threat and one promise message. Post pilot 
experiment interviews with subjects indicated that ail subjects used 
threat messages and did so merely because thèse messages were 
available. 
10
 SIEGEL and FOURAKER, ibid, stated that in laboratory experiments on 
bargaining such variables should be either systematically studied or controlled. There-
fore, because face-to-face negotiations could possibly hâve had an impact upon the 
negotiation process and outcome, interpersonal communication was limited to written 
bids. 
11
 Effects of threats on bilatéral negotiations are discussed in, Harold H. 
KELLEY, «Expérimental Studies of Threats in Interpersonal Negotiations». The 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. IX, No. 1, March 1965, 79-105, and in John 
CHENEY, Thomas HARFORD and Léonard SOLOMON, «The Effects of Commu-
nicating Threats and Promises Upon the Bargaining Process », The Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, Vol. XVI, No. 1, March 1972, 99-107. 
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Expérimental Procédure 
The expérimental procédure is the same in both the expérimental 
conditions.12 In order to avoid major group différences between the 
expérimental conditions, ail the subjects were recruited from the under-
graduate students registered at the University of Minnesota during the 
spring quarter, 1974, in collective bargaining classes offered by the In-
dustrial Relations Department. One week before the experiment was 
conducted, the expérimenter approached three classes with the per-
mission of the respective instructors and invited the students to vol-
untarily participate in the experiment. Forty-four students volunteered 
and they were given copies of the «Information for Bargainers». The 
students were given information regarding times and places of the two 
expérimental sessions. They were given the opportunity to sign up for 
the session they found most convenient. At this preparatory stage, 
the subjects were not given any information regarding the différence 
between the two expérimental sessions. They also were not told about 
the rôles they would play in the experiment. The students were inform-
ed that by participating in the experiment they could earn points which 
would contribute to their course grade. 
Thèse 44 students, who participated in the experiment at the 
scheduled times and places, negotiated as members of 22 teams. In 
each expérimental condition, there were eleven teams. In each expéri-
mental session, the students were assigned to the rôles of either union 
and/or employer negotiator by random procédure. Thus, it was possible 
to minimize systematic bias in carrying out the experiment. The union 
and employer negotiators were seated in two separate rooms. In each 
room, their seats were identified from «A» through «K». The subjects 
were instructed in writing that they would be negotiating in the experi-
ment over two issues, namely, the percentage increase of annual 
salaries, and the réduction of weekly hours of work for firefighters 
in the fictitious city of Winterland. Salary negotiations spread a positive 
range of from one to ten percent per year and were measured on the 
following interval scale : 
12
 The major procédural problem in laboratory expérimental method was group 
comparison. If the groups compared are not equal, their différences may hâve an 
impact on results. Similar expérimental procédures are suggested if différent expéri-
mental conditions are employed. See, Carol FLEISHER FELDMAN, and Wilbur A. 
HASS. «Controls, Conceptualization, and Interrelation Between Expérimental and 
Correlational Research», American Psychologist, Vol. 25, No. 7, July 1970, 633-635. 
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Percentage 
Increaseof 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Animal 
Salaries 
Scale 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
The hours issue was negotiated over a range of from fifty-eight to forty 
hours per week using two hour intervais. As shown below, hours were 
measured on a one through ten interval scale : 
Weekly 
Hours 58 56 54 52 50 48 46 44 42 40 
of Work 
Scale 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
The subjects were informed in written instructions that they could 
earn as many as one-hundred points depending upon their negotiating 
performance. They were told that the points they earned would be 
notified to their instructor who would award an appropriate grade as 
given below depending on the number of points the subject secured in 
the experiment: 
75 to 100 points «A» grade 
50 to 74 points « B » grade 
49 points and below « C » grade 
Thèse instructions were based on the assumption that the par-
ticipating students would aspire to achieve as high a grade as possible, 
hopefully an « A ». Such aspirations would motivate them to bargain as 
effectively as possible. The higher the score achieved by one party on 
the team, the lower would be his opponent's score. As shown in 
Tables 1 and 2, in this experiment, the maximum pay-off for a subject 
was 100 points and if one party were to earn 100 points his opponent 
would get only 10 points. Thus, the conflict situation in the experi-
ment had a built-in maximization of différence in pay-offs between the 
two negotiators on a team13. The intra-team conflict was real, since the 
subjects were not told either verbally or via written instructions what 
13
 In real world conflicts, motivation of the parties to negotiate may be high. 
Motivation of the subjects in the laboratory expérimental negotiations can be improved 
if the rewards hâve some value to the participants and if the différence between the 
party's and its opponents' payoffs is maximized. See, Philips S. G ALLO1 Jr., and 
Charles MCCLINCTOCK, «Coopérative and Compétitive Behavior in Mixed Motive 
Games», The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 4, No. 1, March 1965, 68-78. 
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the opponent's pay-off was in the experiment. The confîict situation 
offered no possibility for the subjects to distribute equally their pay-off 
without any real bargaining. 
The subjects assigned to play the rôle of the union were given 
«Instructions for Union, (See Appendix I)», « Pay-off Table for Union» 
(Table 1) and eleven copies of the proposai (Figure 1). 
The subjects assigned to play the rôle of the employer were also given 
a set of «Instructions for Employer» (See Appendix II), «Pay-off 
Table for Employer» (Table 2) and eleven copies of the counter-
proposal (Figure 2). The subjects were then allowed a trial negotiation 
before the actual negotiation commenced. The union initiated and 
forwarded a trial proposai to which the employer responded with a 
trial counterproposal. The expérimenter collected the trial proposai and 
trial counterproposal. If the trial proposai and counterproposal bids 
were identical on the respective issues, then the team reached a bilatéral 
agreement. None of the teams in the experiment had a trial seulement 
and hence ail the trial impasses were resolved through third party inter-
vention, the latter issuing a trial binding award. The identity of the third 
TABLE 1 
Payoff Table For Union 
Percentage Weekly Hours of Work 
Increase 
of Annual 58 56 54 52 50 48 46 44 42 40 
Salaries 
of Firemen Bid 
Numbers 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
: Payoff Points 
One 1 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 
Two 2 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 
Three 3 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 
Four 4 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 
Five 5 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 
Six 6 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 
Seven 7 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 
Eight 8 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 
Nine 9 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 
Ten 10 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100 
* Please use only bid numbers in bargaining. 
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FIGURE 1 
Proposai 
I demand the following bids for the firemen in the City of Winter-
land: 
Salaries Bid No 
Hours of work Bid No 
party neutral person was not revealed to the subjects. To maintain 
the anonymity of the third party neutral person, the expérimenter 
collected the trial proposais and counterproposals and brought them to 
TABLE 2 
Payoff Table For Employer 
Percentage 
Increase 
of Annual 58 56 54 52 50 48 46 44 42 40 
Salaries 
of Firemen 
Bid 
Numbers 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Payoff Points 
One 1 100 95 90 85 80 75 70 65 60 55 
Two 2 95 90 85 80 75 70 65 60 55 50 
Three 3 90 85 80 75 70 65 60 55 50 45 
Four 4 85 80 75 70 65 60 55 50 45 40 
Five 5 80 75 70 65 60 55 50 45 40 35 
Six 6 75 70 65 60 55 50 45 40 35 30 
Seven 7 70 65 60 55 50 45 40 35 30 25 
Eight 8 65 60 55 50 45 40 35 30 25 20 
Nine 9 60 55 50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 
Ten 10 55 50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 
Please use only bid numbers in bargaining 
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Figure 2 
Counterproposal 
I offer the following bids for the firemen in the City of Winter-
land: 
Salaries Bid No 
Hours of work Bid No 
a separate room. He, then, came back to the expérimental rooms with 
trial awards. (The trial award was issued in each expérimental condition 
following a separate procédure which is discussed in the following 
sub-section). On an individual basis, the expérimenter informed the 
subjects of the arbitration award and the associated points earned in 
the trial session. Finally, the subjects were told that the trial-run had 
no relevance to the points that could ultimately be earned in the experi-
ment. 
Following the trial, the teams were given exactly thirty minutes 
to complète actual negotiations. The expérimenter exchanged the 
proposais of each union negotiator with only one specified employer 
negotiator. He did this by identifying the negotiator s in teams «A» 
through «K» for each expérimental session. After 30 minutes had 
expired, the negotiators were asked to stop their bargaining. At this 
point in the process, if the employer was agreeable to the bids in the 
proposai, or if the union was satisfied with the bids in the counter-
proposal, they were told to exchange similar bids. By so doing, they 
reached an agreement and were able to immediately figure out the 
points they earned in the negotiations. If, on the other hand, they were 
not able to reach a seulement, they were told that their last proposais 
and last counterproposals would be considered by a third party neutral 
person.14 
14
 At the end of the session, the expérimenter informed the subjects that they 
would leave ail of the documents relevant to the experiment in their seats. It is thèse 
documents which comprised the expérimenter's data base. 
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The Arbitral Décision Criteria 
In each expérimental session, the subjects were instructed in 
writing, before the commencement of trial negotiations, regarding the 
décision criteria followed by the neutral person in awarding points. In 
the expérimental condition I (FOS) the subjects were informed that the 
neutral was absolutely free to award either the union's last proposai 
or the employer's last counterproposal.15 The subjects in the expéri-
mental condition II (LOBI) were told that the neutral would award one 
of the foliowing four.16 
1) Both the bids on the union's last proposai; or 
2) Both the bids on the employer's last counterproposal; or 
3) The bid on salaries from the union's last proposai and the bid 
on weekly hours of work from employer's last counter-
proposal; or 
4) The bid on salaries from the employer's last counterproposal 
and the bid on weekly hours of work from the union's last 
proposai. 
In both the expérimental sessions, the expérimenter played the 
rôle of the third party neutral person, a fact never revealed to the 
participants. Under expérimental condition I (FOS), the arbitration 
award was determined by a toss of a coin. The union's proposai 
was awarded in the case of a head, and the employer's counterproposal 
was awarded in the case of tail. Under expérimental condition II 
(LOBI) arbitration option actually awarded was drawn off a random 
table. Out of the two bids — union's and employer's — on each issue, 
one was randomly selected. Excepting the third party neutral person's 
décision criteria, the expérimental procédures and controls were exact-
15
 For illustration, the union's last proposai had bids 8 (on salaries) and 9 
(on weekly hours of work) and the employer's last counterproposal has bids 3 (on 
salaries) and 2 (on weekly hours of work). The neutral will sélect one of the folio wing 
two and that will détermine your points : 
1) 8 (on salaries) and 9 (on weekly hours of work) ; or 
2) 3 (on salaries) and 2 (on weekly hours of work). 
16
 For illustration, the union's last proposai has bids 8 (on salaries) and 9 
(on weekly hours of work) and the employer's last counterproposal has bids 3 (on 
salaries) and 2 (on weekly hours of work). The neutral person will sélect one of the 
following four and that will détermine your points : 
1) 8 (on salaries) and 9 (on weekly hours of work) or 
2) 3 (on salaries) and 2 (on weekly hours of work) or 
3) 8 (on salaries) and 2 (on weekly hours of work) or 
4) 3 (on salaries) and 9 (on weekly hours of work). 
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ly similar within the two expérimental conditions. Hence, the resulting 
différences in the negotiation process and outcome which are analyzed 
in the following section can be attributed to the différences in impact 
between the arbitrators' décision criteria in the two Systems of binding 
arbitration. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The effect of variation in the independent variable (i.e., the Sys-
tems of binding arbitration) on the dépendent variable (i.e., terminal 
outcomes and parties' concessions) was analyzed in order to discern 
whether the results confirmed or rejected the hypothized impact of the 
two Systems of arbitration on negotiation process and outcome. 
The terminal outcome was a negotiation outcome index measuring 
the sum of the différences between the union's and employer's final 
bids on the two negotiable issues, namely, the salary and hours of 
work.17 Since the parties in negotiations might maintain a desired pay 
off level by simultaneously increasing the bid on one issue while 
decreasing the bid on the other, the terminal outcome associated with 
each of the issues was summarized in an effort to construct a total 
terminal outcome measure for each team. The means and standard 
déviations of terminal outcomes in the FOS and LOBI Systems are 
reported in Table 3. The mean of terminal outcomes in the LOBI sys-
Number of teams 
Means 
Standard déviations 
TABLE 3 
Terminal Outcome 
Final-offer- Last-offer-
selection by-issue 
system 
11 
2.8 
system 
5.9 
1.89 2.19 
tems was larger than that in the FOS system. The différence between 
the two means of terminal outcomes was statistically significant (t = 3.4, 
17
 As an illustration, if the union's final bids with respect to salaries and 
hours were '9' (9 percent increase) and '6' (43 hours of work week) and the employer's 
final bid were '5' (5 percent increase) and '2' (56 hours of work week) then the index 
value of the team's terminal outcome would be 8: '4' point différence on salaries plus 
a 4' point différence on hours. 
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P > .01). The results of analysis of terminal outcomes, thus, rejected 
the hypothesis of no differential impact of the two Systems of arbitra-
tion on terminal outcome. 
Negotiation process was analyzed in terms of the concessionary 
behavior followed by the parties during negotiations. Concessionary 
behaviour of union was measured as the sum of the différence between 
the union's initial and final bids on the salary and hours of work is-
sues. 18 The means and standard déviations of unions' concessions are 
reported in Table 4. The results indicate that the unions' concessions 
are more or less equal in both the Systems of arbitration. 
Number of subjects 
Means 
Standard déviations 
TABLE 4 
Unions' Concessions 
Final-offer- Last-offer 
selection by-issue 
System system 
11 11 
4.4 4.3 
2.14 1.49 
Concessionary behaviour of employer was measured as the sum 
of the différence between the employer's final and initial bids on salary 
and hours of work issues.19 The means and standard déviations of 
employers' concessions are reported in Table 5. The means of em-
ployers' concessions were différent between the two Systems of arbi-
tration (t = 1.30, P > .2). The employer's concessions were larger in 
the FOS system than in the LOBI system. The analysis of results of 
employers' concessions did not confirm the hypothesis of equal impact 
of the two Systems of arbitration on negotiation process. 
The results of parties' concessionary behaviour and terminal 
outcomes are briefly discussed with référence to the two research 
18
 As an illustration, if '9' and '5' were the initial and final bids, respectiveiy, 
of the union on salary and '8' and '4' were the initial and final bids, respectiveiy, of 
a union on hours of work, then the union was shown to hâve conceded by '8' : '4' units 
attributed to salary and '4' units attributed to hours of concessions. 
19
 As an illustration, if '2' and '6' are the initial and final bids, respectiveiy, 
of the employer on salary and '1 ' and '5' are the initial and final bids, respectiveiy, 
in hours of work, then the employer was shown to hâve conceded '8 ' : '4' units attri-
buted to salary and '4' units attributed to hours of work concessions. 
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Number of subjects 
Means 
Standard déviations 
TABLE 5 
Employers Concessions 
Final-offer- Last-offer-
selection by-issue 
system system 
11 11 
4.7 3.3 
2.88 1.81 
questions raised in the study. With respect to the first question, the 
results suggest that the two Systems hâve a differential impact on the 
negotiation process and outcome. Regarding the second question, the 
results indicate that the two Systems may not hâve a differential impact 
on the unions' concessionary behaviour but they do hâve on employers' 
negotiations. During negotiations, employers conceded more in the FOS 
system than in the LOBI system. Because of the larger employers' con-
cessions in the FOS than in the LOBI system, the mean of terminal 
outcomes in the former system was smaller than that in the latter 
system. 
The differential impact of the two Systems of arbitration on nego-
tiation process and outcome is of considérable importance to policies 
relating to impasse resolution procédures in labour-management rela-
tions. In the FOS system of binding arbitration, bilatéral parties may 
negotiate and concède for the purpose of avoiding an award based on 
the opponents' package of final offers. If their concessions fail to 
converge in a bilatéral agreement, they may not be able to avoid an 
award. But the award may hâve eliminated the expected cost of dis-
agreement to a party whose package of final offers was selected by 
the arbitrator. If the arbitrator awarded the party's package of final 
offers because it was more reasonable than that of the opponent, the arbi-
trators décision might reinforce the party's pre-arbitration negotiation 
behaviour. The opponent who may hâve failed to negotiate and develop 
a reasonable package of final offers may hâve to incur the cost of dis-
agreement. Since the extent of the cost of disagreement to the opponent 
is related directly to the différence between its own package of final 
offers and that of the party which was awarded, the opponent may 
learn through expérience and during the subséquent round of contract 
negotiations in the FOS system, may negotiate genuinely for the purpose 
of reaching bilatéral agreements. 
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In the LOBI System, on the other hand, parties may withhold 
concessions on some or ail issues in negotiation with the expectation 
that the arbitrator may award by compromising the interests of bilatéral 
parties. If the arbitration award consists of party's last offers on some 
issues and those of the opponent on the other remaining issues, the 
arbitrator's décision may confirm the party's expectations and may rein-
force their respective pre-arbitration negotiation behaviours. The parties 
may learn to withhold and may not negotiate genuinely during subsé-
quent rounds of contract negotiations in the LOBI System. In other 
words, the arbitral décision criteria and the discrétion given to the 
arbitrator in developing an award in the LOBI system, may hâve a 
«chilling effect»20 on bilatéral negotiations. 
The results of this research seem to indicate that the impact of 
the LOBI system on negotiation process and outcome may be more or 
less like that of the conventional binding arbitration, whereas the FOS 
system, as a « strike-like » institution may generate «free» negotiations 
leading to bilatéral agreements. Of the two « one-or-the-other » arbi-
tration Systems analyzed in this study, the final-offer-selection system 
of binding arbitration seems to hâve the impact similar to that of the 
right to workstoppage on negotiation process and outcome. Hence, 
the final-offer-selection system may be the real alternative to the 
« strike-route » and it should replace the « arbitration-route » which is 
one of the two dispute resolution processes21 provided in the Canadian 
Fédéral Public Service Staff Relations Act of 1967. 
APPENDIX I 
Instructions for Union 
You hâve been grouped at random with one other student into a bargaining unit 
and hâve been selected at random to assume the rôle of the Président of the Inter-
national Council of Firemen, Local 1000. You will be referred to for the reniainder of 
the experiment as 'union'. Your bargaining partner will play the rôle of the Fire 
Commissioner of the Fire Department, City of Winterland. He will be designated as 
'employer'. The identity of your partner, as well as your own, will be kept secret; at 
20
 Peter FEUILLE, «Final Offer Arbitration and the Chilling Effect», Indus-
trial Relations, Vol. 14, No. 3, October 1975, 302-310. 
21
 For a discussion of the two alternative impasse resolution procédures in the 
Canadian Fédéral Public Service Staff Relations Acts of 1967, see A. V. SUBBARAO, 
«The Impact of the Two Dispute Resolution Processes on Negotiations», Relations 
Industrielles, Vol. 32, No. 2, 1977, 216-233. 
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no time will you either see him or speak with him. Your task in the experiment is to 
bargain with the employer. 
Your payoff Table shows the number of points you can earn. Your payoff is 
the number of points in the cell at the intersection of the row representing the per-
centage increase in annual salaries and the column indicating the réduction of weekly 
hours of work. For illustration, if you hâve settled for a ten percent increase in salaries 
and a 40 hour work week, you hâve eamed 100 points. 
You will bargain by exchanging proposais with the employer. You will hâve to 
record the bid numbers on each proposai when it is exchanged with the employer. 
Each proposai has provision for two bids, one with respect to the percentage increase 
of annual salaries and the other for the réduction of weekly hours of work. 
You will initiate bargaining by proposing the percentage increase of annual 
salaries and the réduction of weekly hours of work for your firemen. You should start 
bargaining from a position which is quite favorable to you. The higher the number of the 
bid, the greater will be your payoff. The expérimenter will take your proposai to 
the employer. If he agrées, you hâve a seulement with your bargaining partner and you 
will be so informed by the expérimenter. Otherwise, the expérimenter will bring you 
a counterproposal from the employer. You hâve now two options: (1) agrée with 
employer's counterproposal and so inform the expérimenter or (2) make another proposai 
with a new set of bids. The bargaining session will be limited to 30 minutes and you 
can send a maximum of 10 proposais. You are not absolutely required to send ail the 
10 proposais, if you do not want to and you are at liberty to set intervais between your 
proposais to suit your stratégies and conveniences. You will stop bargaining exactly 
after 30 minutes time is over. 
Ail your proposais must be in good faith. If the employer agrées to your proposai, 
you are bound to honor those bids. You must therefore be sure that you would be 
satisfied with each proposai you make, if that proposai were to be accepted. If the 
employer makes you another counterproposal, however, you are released from your 
previous proposai and you may propose any new bids you may wish. 
If you hâve settled with your bargaining partner, the bargaining is ail over. If 
you hâve not settled within 30 minutes, the bargaining is automatically terminated. A 
neutral person will then award points to you and your bargaining partner. 
APPENDIX II 
Instructions for Employer 
You hâve been grouped at random with one other student into a bargaining 
unit and hâve been selected at random to assume the rôle of the Fire Commissioner 
of the Fire Department, City of Winterland. You will be referred to for the remainder 
of the experiment as 'employer'. Your bargaining partner will play the rôle of the 
Président of the International Council of Firemen, Local 1000. He will be designated 
as 'union'. The identity of your partner, as well as your own, will be kept secret; and 
at no time will you either see him or speak with him. Your task in the experiment 
is to bargain with the union. 
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Your payoff Table shows the number of points you can earn. Your payoff is the 
number of points in the cell at the intersection of the row representing the percentage 
increase of annual salary and the column indicating the réduction of weekly hours of 
work. For illustration, if you hâve settled for one percent increase of annual salary and 
58 hour work week, you hâve earned 100 points. 
You will bargain by exchanging counterproposal s with the union. You will hâve 
the record the bid numbers on each counterproposal when it is exchanged with the 
union. Each counterproposal has provision for two bids, one with respect to percentage 
increase in annual salary and the other for the réduction of weekly hours of work. 
The bargaining commences for you when the expérimenter brings the union 
proposai. You should start bargaining from a position which is quite favorable to you. 
The lower the number of the bid, the greater will be your payoff. You hâve two options 
open when you receive the union's proposai: (1) agrée with the union's proposai and 
so inform the expérimenter, or (2) make another counterproposal with a new set of 
bids. The bargaining session will be limited to 30 minutes and you can send a maximum 
of 10 counterproposals. You are not absolutely required to send ail the 10 counter-
proposals, if you do not want to and you are at liberty to set intervais betvveen your 
proposais to suit your stratégies and conveniences. You will stop bargaining exactly 
after 30 minutes time is over. 
AU your counterproposals must be in good faith. If the union agrées to your 
counterproposal, you are bound to honor those bids. You must, therefore, be sure 
that you would be satisfied with each counterproposal you make, if that counter-
proposal were to be accepted. If the union makes you another proposai, however, 
you are released from your previous counterproposal and you may counterpropose any 
new bids you may wish. 
If you hâve settled with your bargaining partner, the bargaining is ail over. If 
you hâve not settled within 30 minutes, the bargaining is automatically termiinated. A 
neutral person will then award points to you and your bargaining partner. 
Arbitrage des propositions finales 
ou l'arbitrage de chaque problème 
L'arbitrage des propositions finales, en tant que méthode de règlement des im-
passes, existe dans plusieurs législations en Amérique du Nord. Toutefois, ce système 
diffère de l'une à l'autre au moins sous quatre aspects: les sujets arbitrables, la for-
mation du conseil d'arbitrage, le rôle de l'arbitre et les critères de décision. 
Suivant les critères de décision que les arbitres doivent suivre dans le règlement 
des impasses en matière d'arbitrage des propositions finales, il existe deux systèmes 
ou régimes. L'un consiste dans l'arbitrage des propositions finales dans leur globalité 
où l'arbitre doit trancher le conflit en statuant sur l'enveloppe globale présentée par 
les parties; l'autre où l'arbitre tranche point par point en choisissant pour chacun 
d'eux la dernière proposition des parties avant la rupture des négociations. 
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L'article analyse les conséquences de l'un et de l'autre systèmes d'arbitrage 
exécutoire sur le processus et le dénouement des négociations. Théoriquement, on est 
venu à la conclusion que chacun de ces deux systèmes pouvait avoir des réactions 
différentes sur le processus et le dénouement des négociations. L'expérience a permis 
de vérifier toutes les variables autres que les critères de décision qui différencient 
les deux systèmes. Les différences entre les deux critères sont importantes pour 
comprendre les effets divergents qu'ils ont sur le processus et le dénouement des 
négociations. 
Le premier système (l'arbitrage des propositions globales) considéré comme 
substitut de la grève, incite les parties à s'entendre, alors que le deuxième système 
(l'arbitrage des propositions finales point par point), tout comme l'arbitrage traditionnel, 
a un effet de «glaciation» dans les négociations bilatérales. 
Le système d'arbitrage des propositions finales globales a sur les négociations un 
impact comparable à celui de la grève au choix sous le régime de négociation dans la 
fonction publique fédérale. Il peut donc le remplacer comme l'une des méthodes de 
règlement des conflits pour les employés de la fonction publique fédérale. 
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